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Country data
Population:   2.79 million (July 2005 est.) 
Area:   1,566,500 sq km (slightly larger than
Alaska)
Location: Sandwiched between Russia (north)
and China (south)
Life Expectancy:  64.52 years (2005)
GDP:   $1.6 billion (2004, World Bank Group)
Resources: oil, coal, copper, molybdenum,
tungsten, phosphates, tin, nickle, zinc,
fluorspar, gold, silver, iron
Primary export partners 2004: China (50.7%);
US(26.3%);  Canada (5 .3%); UK
(4.3%);Russia(4.2%)
Primary import partners 2004: Russia (31%);
China (23.1%); Japan (8.4%); South Korea
(6.7%)
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Summary
On January 10, 2006, Mongolia’s delicately balanced coalition government
collapsed and the Mongolian parliament chose a new Prime Minister in accordance with
constitutional requirements.  Mongolia has seen several reshufflings of government
since 1990, the year the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) declared the
end of a one-party communist state and initiated democratic reforms with U.S.
assistance.  Since then, Mongolia’s profile has been raised further by the 2005 visits of
President George Bush and Secretary Donald Rumsfeld.  This report provides
background information on Mongolia, including political and economic conditions, the
status of U.S.-Mongolian political and economic relations, and key security and foreign
policy issues.  This report will not be updated.
Background
Once part of the Chinese empire,
Mongolia achieved independence in
1921 in a revolution backed by the
Soviet Union.  After this, the communist
Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party
(MPRP) ruled for almost 70 years,
maintaining a tenuous balance between
the Soviet Union and China and
receiving substantial financial assistance
from each. Public demonstrations for
political pluralism in 1990 led to the
resignation of the Communist MPRP
government, whose leaders declared the
end of a one-party Communist state.
Since then, Mongolia has been
undergoing a political and economic
transition to a parliamentary democracy
under new constitutional rules adopted in 1991.  After decades of dependency on Soviet
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1 Sources for this section include the Far Eastern Economic Review, the Wall Street Journal, and
the Foreign Broadcast Information Service.
2 The MPRP, having shrugged off Communism, nevertheless did not officially adopt a new,
Socialist agenda until March of 1997, when it amended its party platform.
3 The International Republican Institute (IRI), in particular, has an extensive democracy-building
program in Mongolia, conducting election training programs and assisting with parliamentary
development. 
aid ( at one point worth nearly 40% of the country’s GDP), Mongolia has sought to
broaden its foreign contact and trade.  
Political Trends and Conditions1
Despite the official demise of Communism in Mongolia in 1990, the formerly
communist MPRP has continued to play a dominant political role.2  In the first popular
elections ever for Mongolia’s parliament in 1990, the formerly communist People’s Great
Hural, the MPRP won 80% of the seats.  In turn, the same year, this MPRP-dominated
parliament elected an MPRP member, P. Ochirbat, as Mongolia’s first president.  While
a new constitution in 1992 created a new parliament (the State Great Hural) to replace the
People’s Great Hural, the MPRP also won a significant majority in the new body.  Its 71
out of a total of 76 seats gave it firm control while Mongolia’s fledgling opposition parties
remained essentially powerless.  But the balance began to tip away from the MPRP in
1994, when the party turned against Ochirbat after he vetoed legislation passed by the
parliament.   When Ochirbat lost the MPRP’s backing in Mongolia’s first direct
presidential election in 1993, he ran and won as an opposition candidate.  
Weak Governmental Institutions, Corruption.   Mongolia’s legal and
financial institutions remain underdeveloped and are a serious impediment to improving
the country’s economy and business climate.  In part because of these weak institutions,
the existence and enforcement of laws protecting private property is extremely limited
even though the government passed a land ownership law in 2002 that allows the sale of
farmland to individuals.  Governmental corruption also is becoming a more acute problem
and was the subject of demonstrations and protests during the 2005 presidential election
campaign. In some respects, and with considerable assistance from western democratic
organizations, the fledgling government has made great strides in the 15 years since it
adopted multi-party politics.3  Still, Mongolia’s legislative processes remain in their
infancy.  It was only in 2004, for instance, that Mongolia’s parliament, the State Great
Hural (SGH), passed measures giving parliamentary committees separate budgets, staff,
and rules of procedure.  The first public hearing by a parliamentary committee was held
only in 2002, although western groups providing assistance are encouraging the SGH to
hold public hearings as a routine part of the legislative process. 
Legislative Elections of 1996
Mongolia’s parliamentary elections on June 30, 1996, were the first in which an
effective, organized opposition existed to challenge the MPRP’s 75-year rule.  The
“Democratic Union,” formed over a period of about five years by a coalition of eight
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4 The two largest parties in the coalition were the Mongolian National Democratic Party (MNDP)
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opposition parties, was the only party to field a clear and recognizable political platform
to challenge MPRP candidates.4  It achieved a stunning electoral victory in what was
widely regarded as a free and fair election.  With 91% of the electorate turning out to vote,
the Democratic Coalition took 50 of the 76 seats, giving it a majority in the parliament as
well as the support of President Ochirbat.  The new Mongolian leadership was quoted as
crediting the victory to help from U.S. political strategists and to study of American
political devices — the “Contract with America” in particular.
Economic issues, political reform, and foreign relations dominated the 1996 election
campaign. In a political strategy that many came to view as the cause of the MPRP’s
downfall, the party offered no firm prescriptions for Mongolia’s political problems or for
its relations with other countries.  Democratic Union coalition candidates, on the other
hand,  put forward a more specific policy agenda, vowing to make government more
transparent, sell state-owned media organizations, establish pension plans, increase
teacher salaries, and reform Mongolia’s judicial system.  Finally, the coalition placed a
strong emphasis on friendship with the West — primarily with the United States, which
the coalition called Mongolia’s “third neighbor.” 
Instability in 1997
 Mongolia held two related elections in 1997. In the presidential election on May 18,
the results of the 1993 presidential election were reversed, and the presidency was won
by Natsagiin Bagabandi, the MPRP candidate, leaving the government divided between
the executive and the parliament.  Bagabandi won with 60.8 percent of the vote against
two other candidates:  the incumbent of seven years, President Ochirbat, from the
Democratic Union coalition, which retained its majority in the Great Hural from the 1996
elections; and Gombojav, from the Mongolian Unity Party (MUP).  On August 20, 1997,
Mongolia held an interim parliamentary election to replace Bagabandi, who had to give
up his seat in the Great Hural in order to become president.  Bagabandi’s former
parliamentary seat was won by MPRP member Nambaryn Enkhbayar.  
To some extent, political analysts at the time regarded Bagabandi’s election as a
symbolic gesture of public frustration over the drastic and painful economic reforms
imposed by the new government after the 1996 elections.  Under those reforms,
unemployment, crime, and taxes rose, while other financial and economic policies were
not entirely successful.  In addition, some believed that the Democratic coalition majority
elected in 1996 did not communicate its goals and policies effectively enough to the
public to sustain its popularity in the 1997 presidential election cycle.  Most believed that
Bagabandi’s election would not change the overall direction of democratic development
and reform in Mongolia.  For one thing, Mongolia’s 1991 Constitution reserves only
limited powers to the President — in principle, the power to veto — while giving most
political power to the Great Hural, including the power to appoint government ministers.
Nevertheless, the Democratic coalition’s 50-seat majority in the Great Hural, though
substantial, was still one vote short of the margin needed to override presidential vetoes.
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Break-up of Democratic Coalition, 1998-2000 
Mongolia’s political situation in 1998 became more tumultuous, with a series of
political crises leading to much legislative maneuvering between the MPRP-led
government and the ruling Democratic coalition.  On April 17, 1998, Prime Minister
Enksaikhan announced his resignation in the wake of public discontent over harsh reform
measures he had adopted to strengthen the Mongolian economy.  On April 23, 1998,
Enksaikhan was replaced as Prime Minister by MNDP member Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj,
the majority leader in parliament, who was elected with 60 votes out of the total of 76
members in the Great Hural.  Elbegdorj, in turn, was forced to resign by a no-confidence
vote in the Great Hural on July 24, 1998 — making his government the shortest-lived in
Mongolia’s brief democratic history — because of his controversial decision on May 27,
1998, to allow the state-owned Renovation Bank to merge into the privately held Golomt
Bank.  The parliamentary group of the MPRP charged that the decision on the bank
merger violated the Mongolian constitution and posed a threat to national economic
security.  In the ensuing months, the ruling parliamentary coalition struggled for several
months with President Bagabandi over the naming of a new Prime Minister, with
Bagabandi repeatedly rejecting the Great Hural’s choice of Davaadorj Ganbold.  
In December 1998, the new MNDP leader, Janlavyn Narantsatsralt, became Prime
Minister. But his government fell in scandal in July 1999.  On July 30, 1999, the Great
Hural endorsed as Prime Minister Rinchinnyamyn Amarjargal, another Democratic
coalition candidate.  Ultimately, in 2000, the strain of these political crises proved too
much for the Democratic coalition.  It collapsed, setting the stage for a dramatic
comeback by the MPRP in parliamentary elections in July, when MPRP candidates won
72 out of the 76 seats in the Great Hural.  That month, the MPRP leader, Nambaryn
Enkhbayar, became Mongolia’s 5th Prime Minister in two years.  In December 2000, the
remnants of the former Democratic coalition, including the MNDP and the MSDP,
merged to form the Democratic Party (DP).  President Bagabandi was elected to a second
term as president in May 2001.
Coalition Government Collapse, 2006 
Mongolia’s latest political crisis was born in the 2004 parliamentary elections when
an assortment of democratic-minded parties under the umbrella title Motherland
Democracy Coalition (MDC) won 34 parliamentary seats (out of a total of 76) to the
MPRP’s 38 seats.  After weeks of political gridlock, the two groups compromised to form
a workable coalition government:  the Democratic Party leader, Tsakhiagiyn Elbegdorj,
became the new Prime Minister and the MPRP assumed 10 positions in Elbegdorj’s 18-
member cabinet.  But the troubled government struggled with growing unemployment,
allegations of corruption, and factional differences.
The increasing popular disillusionment with the coalition’s rule was reflected in
presidential elections in May 2005, when MPRP candidate and former Prime Minister
Nambaryn Enkhbayar won the presidency (a less influential, though still powerful,
position than that of Prime Minister) with 53.4% of the vote, compared to the 19.7%
garnered by his Democracy Party rival, Mendsaikhani Enkhsaikhan.  On January 11,
2006, the fragile government collapsed altogether when all 10 MPRP cabinet members
resigned in protest to what they said was the alliance’s ineffective governance and loss
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8 Global Insight projects real GDP growth at 6.8% in 2005.
of public support.  The collapse was followed by days of protests in the capital — some
protesting government corruption and economic deprivation, some accusing the MPRP
of attempting to seize power for itself.  The official government response to the MPRP
resignation, however, followed established political procedures.  On January 25, 2006, the
parliament chose Miyeegombo Enkhbold, MPRP chairman, as the new Prime Minister
succeeding Elbegdorj.  According to reports, the Democratic Party declined the MPRP’s
offer to join in a “national unity” government and instead will function as an opposition
and establish a “shadow cabinet.”5  The next parliamentary elections are in 2008.  
Economic Trends and Conditions6
Mongolia’s economy is relatively poor and agrarian, with few industries but
extensive mineral deposits.   Per capita GDP on a purchasing power parity (a common
measurement of living standards) in 2004 was $1,900 (equivalent to about 5% of U.S.
levels).  Agriculture is the dominant economic sector (especially herding), accounting for
about one-third of annual GDP.  Mining accounts for about half of Mongolia’s gross
industrial output and about one-third of its exports.
The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s had a severe impact on
Mongolia’s economy, which had employed Soviet-style economic policies.7  After Soviet
aid ended, real GDP fell by 9.2% in 1991 and by 9.5% in 1992, leading to a significant
decline in Mongolian living standards.   Subsequently, the central government moved to
privatize its state-owned economy and adopt other free market reforms.  Between 1990
and 2004, the proportion of GDP accounted for by the private sector rose from 4% to
80%.  Such reforms enabled Mongolia to join the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
1997.  Economic growth over the past few years has been uneven. Real GDP grew by only
1.0% in 2000 and by 1.1% in 2001 (due in part to severe weather conditions, which
damaged the agriculture sector).  However, real GDP grew by 3.9% in 2002, 5.0% in
2003, and by 10.6% in 2004.8  In 2003, Mongolia agreed to pay Russia $250 million, an
enormous sum for the government, to resolve most of its debt obligations in an effort to
strengthen investor confidence. Among other economic challenges Mongolia faces is a
weak banking system (much of which is still state-owned and is thought to be saddled
with a significant level of non-performing loans), public resistence to land reforms, sharp
fluxes in global mineral prices, high unemployment, weak rule of law, government
corruption, harsh weather conditions, and inadequate infrastructure.
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U.S.-Mongolian Relations
The United States recognized Mongolia in 1987 and since then has sought to expand
cultural and economic ties.  In 1991, following the signing of a bilateral trade agreement,
the President restored Mongolia’s most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status — now
referred to as Normal Trade Relations (NTR) — under the conditional annual waiver
provisions of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974.  NTR status was made permanent for
Mongolia effective July 1, 1999, obviating the annual trade status review process.9
Mongolia remains a relatively minor (though growing) U.S. trading partner.
According to International Monetary Fund (IMF) statistics, in 2005, U.S. exports to
Mongolia totaled $21.5 million, while imports totaled $144 million.10  According to the
U.S. Department of Commerce, the most promising sectors for increased U.S. exports to
Mongolia include mining, construction, franchising, information technology, tourism, and
meat processing.  In July 2004, the United States signed a Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA) with Mongolia to boost bilateral commercial ties and
resolve trade disputes.  Since 1991, the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) has provided around $150 million in assistance to Mongolia.  Major USAID
programs have focused largely on promoting sustainable private sector-led economic
growth and more effective and accountable governance.  Mongolia also is eligible for
assistance under the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account.  
One primary U.S. interest in Mongolia is in supporting the country’s ongoing
transition from a communist state to a nation with a market-based economy and a
democratically elected government.  U.S. support for both Mongolia’s political and its
economic reforms has been tangible.  The United States strongly supported Mongolia
when it joined the IMF, the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank in 1991.
Congress annually has earmarked U.S. assistance amounts for Mongolia to signal its
support.  
Anti-Terror Support.   Mongolia was an early political supporter of the U.S.
global anti-terror effort, as well as an early logistics supporter, offering training
opportunities and overflight clearances for U.S. forces.  Mongolia has contributed troops,
engineers, and medical personnel to Operation Iraqi Freedom since April 2003.  At the
request of the United States, Mongolian forces also are participating in training artillery
units of the Afghan National Army.  U.S. appreciation for this assistance led in part to last
year’s visits to Mongolia by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (in October 2005) and
President George Bush (in November 2005) — the first U.S. Defense Secretary and U.S.
President ever to visit Mongolia.  President Bush’s visit resulted in a Joint Statement
reaffirming the U.S.-Mongolian “comprehensive partnership between their two
democratic countries based on shared values and common strategic interests...”11
